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Introduction
Economists have long regarded supermodularity as the formal expression of complementarity in preference; according to Samuelson (1947) , the use of supermodularity as a notion of complementarities dates back to Fisher, Pareto and Edgeworth. In this paper, we characterize those weakly monotonic preferences on finite consumption sets that have a supermodular utility representation. We show that, in many ordinal economic models, supermodularity is a very weak assumption which is not testable with data on consumption expenditures.
Supermodularity is a cardinal property of a function defined on a lattice. It roughly states that a function has "increasing differences." For this reason, it is usually interpreted as modeling complementarities. For example, consider a consumer with a utility function over two goods. A seemingly natural notion of complementarity is that the two goods are complementary if the marginal utility of consuming one of the goods is increasing in the consumption of the other; for smooth functions, if the cross-partial derivatives are non-negative.
Because it is a cardinal property, a number of authors, including Allen (1934) , Hicks and Allen (1934) , Samuelson (1947) , and Stigler (1950) , rejected supermodularity as a notion of complementarities. They thought that, because it is not an ordinal notion, it would have no testable implications. While these authors were essentially right, their argument was incomplete. Their argument ran as follows: A supermodular function has positive cross-derivatives. Fix any given point. We may take an ordinal transformation of the function, preserving the preferences it represents, such that some cross-derivatives at this point become negative. While this is correct, it only demonstrates the lack of testable implications of supermodularity as a local property.
1 Supermodularity at any given point (in the form of nonnegative cross-derivatives) is not refutable. They believed that, as a consequence, supermodularity has no global ordinal or behavioral implica-tions. In an influential and important paper, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) introduced quasisupermodularity, an ordinal implication of supermodularity. Any supermodular function generates a quasisupermodular order structure, proving that supermodularity has ordinal content. Our main result characterizes the ordinal content of supermodularity under the additional assumptions of weak monotonicity and finiteness. Under these additional assumptions, it is equivalent to the more general notion of quasisupermodularity. We conclude that supermodularity can only have empirical implications in addition to quasisupermodularity if preferences are not weakly monotonic, or if an infinite number of preferences between objects can be observed. In addition, as all strictly monotonic preferences are quasisupermodular, we conclude that for strictly monotonic preferences, one cannot refute the hypothesis that a utility function is supermodular with a finite number of observations.
A primary implication of our results is that supermodularity is not testable with data on consumption expenditures. Thus, we rigorously confirm the intuition of Samuelson, Hicks, Allen and Stigler. We use a model related to 's, which shows that concavity is not testable with a finite collection of consumption data. We show that, in our model, any data which are generated by the preference maximization of a rational individual can also be generated by the maximization of a supermodular utility function.
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Our results do not imply that supermodularity is a vacuous concept in economic theory. Supermodularity has proved a useful assumption in very different areas of economics. But the environments in which supermodularity is useful are either cardinal, such as convex transferable-utility games, or violate monotonicity, such as applications to games of strategic complementarities.
Under our maintained assumptions of finiteness and weak monotonicity, supermodularity has additional ordinal implications if imposed jointly with other conditions. showed that a differentiable, strongly con-cave and supermodular utility implies a normal demand. shows that a concave and supermodular utility implies a class of monotone comparative statics; among other results, Quah generalizes Chipman's theorem.
We end with a note on the related literature. The seminal papers on supermodularity and lattice programming in economics are Topkis (1978) , Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . The closest papers to ours are Kreps (1979) and . Kreps proves a theorem that one can show is equivalent to our result, but for the special case of a lattice of subsets. Li Calzi describes a class of functions which are strictly increasing transformations of supermodular functions. He is also the first to note a connection between monotonicity and supermodularity.
Definitions
Let X be a set and R be a binary relation on X. We define xP R y if xRy is true and yRx is false. A representation of R is a function u : X → R for which i) for all x, y ∈ X, if xRy, then u (x) ≥ u (y), and ii) for all x, y ∈ X, if xP R y, then u (x) > u (y).
A partial order on X is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on X. A partially-ordered set is a pair (X, ) where X is a set and is a partial order on X. A lattice is a partially-ordered set (X, ) such that for all x, y ∈ X, there exists a unique greatest lower bound x∧y and a unique least upper bound x ∨ y according to . We write x y if neither x y or y x. If (X, ) is a lattice, we say a subset S of X is larger than a subset S in the strong set order if, for all x ∈ S and all y ∈ S , x∨y ∈ S and x∧y ∈ S . We also use the notation ∂S = {x ∈ S : (∀y ∈ X)(x ≺ y ⇒ y / ∈ S)} for the order top boundary of S.
Say that a function u : X → R is weakly increasing if for all x, y ∈ X, x y implies u (x) ≤ u (y). It is strongly increasing if for all x, y ∈ X, x y and x = y imply u (x) < u (y). Say it is weakly decreasing if for all x, y ∈ X, x y implies u (y) ≤ u (x). It is weakly monotonic if it is either weakly increasing or weakly decreasing.
Supermodular Representation
We discuss conditions under which R has a supermodular representation. We first present the equivalence of supermodularity and quasisupermodularity for weakly monotonic functions on finite lattices.
Let (X, ) be a finite lattice. Our primary result is the following.
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Theorem 1: A binary relation on X has a weakly increasing and quasisupermodular representation if and only if it has a weakly increasing and supermodular representation.
Proof: It is clear that any weakly increasing and supermodular representation is also weakly increasing and quasisupermodular. Thus, suppose that u : X → R is a weakly increasing and quasisupermodular representation. We will show that there exists some f : u (X) → R which is strictly increasing, for which f • u is supermodular. As X is finite, u (X) is also finite. Label the elements of u (X) as {u 1 , ..., u N }, where
Moreover, it is also quasisupermodular. Label g ≡ f • u. We will establish that g is supermodular. To this end, let x, y ∈ X. If x y or y x, then it is obvious that g (x) + g (y) ≤ g (x ∧ y) + g (x ∨ y). Thus, suppose that x y. As x x ∧ y and g is weakly increasing, g (x) ≥ g (x ∧ y). If in fact g (x) = g (x ∧ y), the fact that g is weakly increasing implies
, then as g is weakly increasing and quasisupermodular, g (y) = g (x ∧ y), so that
, and g (x ∨ y) > g (x ∧ y) (this last inequality follows as g is weakly increas-
Hence g is supermodular. 2
Remark 1: In Theorem 1, the term "weakly increasing" can be replaced by "weakly decreasing." This argument is as follows. Suppose that u is a weakly decreasing and quasisupermodular function on the lattice (X, ). For all x, y ∈ X, define x y if y x. Then (X, ) is also a lattice; moreover, x (∧ ) y = x∨y and x (∨ ) y = x∧y. Further, u is weakly increasing on (X, ). Lastly, it is clear that u is also quasisupermodular on (X, ). To see this,
Thus u is quasisupermodular on (X, ). Hence, there exists a strictly increasing f :
To see that weak monotonicity alone is not sufficient for supermodularity, consider the following example.
Example 2: Let X = {1, 2} 2 with the usual ordering. Let R be representable by the function u : X → R for which u ((1, 1)) = 0, and u ((1, 2)) = u ((2, 1)) = u ((2, 2)) = 1. Clearly, R cannot be represented by a supermodular function (any such function v would require v ((1, 2) 2) ). Nevertheless, R is weakly monotonic. R cannot be represented by a quasisupermodular function, as u ((1, 2)) > u ((1, 1) ), yet u ((2, 1)) ≥ u ((2, 2)).
To see that monotonicity is not necessary for a supermodular representation, consider the following example.
2 with the usual ordering. Let R be representable by the function u : X → R for which u ((1, 1)) = 0, u ((1, 2)) = −1, u ((2, 1)) = 2, and u ((2, 2)) = 1.5. Clearly, u is (strictly) supermodular. However, note that R is not monotonic.
Strong Monotonicty, Monotone Comparative Statics and Supermodularity
Theorem 1 has an important immediate corollary. The corollary follows because any strongly increasing function is quasisupermodular.
Corollary 4: Let (X, ) be a finite lattice. If a binary relation has a strongly increasing representation, then it has a supermodular representation.
Proof: Let R be a binary relation with a strongly increasing representation u. We claim that u is quasisupermodular. Let x, y ∈ X. First, x x ∧ y and x ∨ y y, so u (x) ≥ u (x ∧ y) and u (x ∨ y) ≥ u (y) hold. Second, if u (x) > u (x ∧ y), then x x∧y and x = x∧y. Hence, x∨y y and x∨y = y, so u (x ∨ y) > u (y). By Theorem 1, R has a supermodular representation.2 Corollary 4 states that any consumer with strongly monotonic preferences can be viewed as maximizing a supermodular utility function. This observation implies that supermodularity, the property of utility which has traditionally been viewed as implying that goods are complementary, is vacuous in a strongly monotonic environment.
As shown by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , quasisupermodular functions are the only objective functions whose comparative statics are monotone for all monotone changes in the constraint set. A combination of Theorem 1 with their results leads to an alternative characterization of supermodular functions. We present some definitions and then reinterpret Milgrom and Shannon's monotonicity theorem as our Corollary 5.
Let u : X → R. Define the correspondence M u : 2 X \∅ ⇒ 2 X \∅ as
in the strong set order whenever S is smaller than S in the strong set order.
Corollary 5: There exists a strictly increasing f : R → R such that the function f • u : X → R is weakly increasing and supermodular if and only if M u is weakly increasing and exhibits non-satiation. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ) and our Theorem 1.
The proof of Corollary 5 is immediate from Milgrom and Shannon's Monotonicity Theorem (Theorem 4 in

Non-Refutability with Consumption Data
Afriat (1967) studies data on consumption choices at different prices. He shows that data can arise from a rational consumer if and only if one can model the consumer using a concave utility function. Concavity of utility is thus not refutable with data on consumption choices. Assuming a finite consumption space, we show that data can arise from a rational consumer if and only if one can model the consumer using a supermodular utility.
k is interpreted as a consumption bundle demanded at prices p k .
Define R on X as xRy if there exists k ∈ {1, ..., K} for which
Note that R is the standard revealed-preference relation.
Suppose that xRy and x = y imply that yRx is false (a version of the weak axiom of revealed preference). Say a function u : X → R is a rationalizes the data (
is rationalizable if and only if it is rationalizable with a supermodular function. This is an implication of the monotonicity of the revealed preference relation; see the supplementary appendix for a discussion and proof.
Afriat's Theorem shows that concavity is not refutable. Our result implies that if, supermodularity is refutable, one must have budget sets with infinite cardinality. The joint assumption of concavity and supermodularity is refutable using a finite number of observations. This is because supermodularity and concavity imply that demand is normal . See , and the supplementary appendix, for details.
This appendix presents our result on non-refutability of supermodularity using a variant of model. Let X ⊆ R n + be a finite lattice. For all k = 1, ..., K, let S k ∈ 2 X \∅ and let x k ∈ S k . A pair (x k , S k ) is a consumption bundle x k demanded by a consumer when the feasible set is S k . This is a natural framework in which to investigate the empirical content of supermodularity in consumer theory. The model is close to Matzkin's (1991) and Forges and Minelli's (2006) generalization of Afriat's model.
We assume data satisfy the following three conditions. The first is a classical "non-satiation" assumption. The second is a "free disposability" assumption. The last requirement is a variant of the weak axiom of revealed preference. It ensures that the revealed-preference relation is asymmetric.
2. For all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, if x ∈ S k and y ≤ x then y ∈ S.
Define R on X by xRy if there exists k ∈ {1, ..., K} such that x = x k and y ∈ S k . Note that R is the standard revealed-preference relation. By 3, for all x, y ∈ X, if xRy and x = y, then xP R y.
Say that u : X → R rationalizes the data (
if it represents R. In other words, u rationalizes the data if a consumer maximizing utility u in S k chooses x k . The function u is called a rationalization of the data.
satisfies 1,2, and 3. Then
is rationalizable if and only if it is rationalized by a supermodular function.
Proof: We write xRy for (x, y) ∈ R and xR τ y if there is a sequence
We first reproduce, as Lemma 2 and without proof, the standard result on when R has a representation (see e.g. Richter (1966) ).
Lemma 2: There is a representation of R if and only if xR τ y implies that yP R x is false.
Let B be the binary relation defined as xBy if xRy or x ≥ y. It is easily verified that xP B y if xP R y or x > y. We show below that B has a representation. Clearly, any representation of B is also a representation of R. To see this, suppose that u rationalizes B. Suppose that xRy. Then xBy, and hence u (x) ≥ u (y). Suppose that xP R y. Then xBy. If yBx, it must be the case that y ≥ x. But as xP R y, x = y, hence y > x. Hence there exists k ∈ {1, ..., K} for which x = x k and y ∈ S k . But this implies that x k / ∈ ∂S k , a contradiction to 1. The proposition then follows from Corollary 4 in , because any representation of B must be strongly monotone.
By Lemma 2, if B has a representation, then so does R. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that B does not have a representation. We will show that R does not have a representation.
If B does not have a representation, then there exist x, y ∈ X for which xB τ y and yP B x. Suppose that x ≥ y. Then yP B x implies that there exists k for which y = x k . But y ∈ ∂S k , so x ≥ y implies x = y, contradicting the fact that yP B x. Therefore, x y. Hence, xB τ y implies that there exists {x 1 , . . . x L } ⊆ X for which xBx 1 B . . . Bx L By, where at least one B corresponds to R and not ≥.
We claim that there exists x = y for which x ≥ x and x R τ y. To see this, note that for any collection of data {z 1 , ..., z m } ⊆ X for which z 1 Rz 2 ≥ z 3 ≥ ... ≥ z m , it follows by the fact that z 2 ≥ z m and Property 2 of the data that z 1 Rz m . From this fact, we establish that there is x = y with x ≥ x and x R τ y. As yP B x, either yP R x or y > x. If yP R x, then yP R x by x ≥ x and Properties 1 and 2 of the data. In this case, we may conclude that R has no representation (Lemma 2). If instead y > x, then we have x R τ y and y > x . Then, x Ry contradicts Property 1 of the data, so there exists x ∈ X, x = x for which x R τ x Ry. Now, y ≥ x and Property 2 of the data imply that x Rx . In fact, by Property 3 and x = x , x P R x . So R does not have a representation. 2
Our model is related to Afriat's in the following way. Afriat assumes that X = R n + (a case our Proposition 1 does not cover). His data consists of pairs (
for which x k ∈ X ⊆ R n + and p k ∈ R n ++ , for all k. Each pair is an observed consumption choice x k at prices p k . Afriat's data obtains when
Note that the weak axiom, Property 3 of the data, is implicit in Afriat's results. If we do not assume Property 3 we would need to distinguish between representability of R and rationalization; the result in Proposition 1 continues to hold. Our model allows us to accommodate non-linear budgets sets. Forges and Minelli (2006) investigate a similar model of non-linear budget sets, and establish that concavity has stronger implications than rationality alone. Thus the non-refutability of supermodularity is more robust than that of concavity, since it continues to hold with general budget sets. Matzkin (1991) first discussed non-linear budget sets to incorporate situations where consumers have monopsony power, or where the consumer is a social planner facing an economy's production possibility set.
Two remarks are in order. First, under an additional restriction on Afriat's data, rationalizability implies that there is a smooth, strongly monotonic rationalization (Chiappori and Rochet, 1987) . Corollary 20 in Li Calzi (1990) then implies the existence of a supermodular rationalization. So one can use existing results to prove a version of Proposition 1 for the Afriat data under Chiappori and Rochet's assumptions.
The second remark refers to concave rationalizations. Afriat shows that data are rationalizable if and only if they are rationalizable by a concave utility. Proposition 1 says that data are rationalizable if and only if they are rationalizable by a supermodular utility. One might conjecture that any rationalizable data con be rationalized by a function that is both concave and supermodular. This turns out to be false. Supermodularity and concavity jointly imply that demand is normal. So, while concavity and supermodularity have no testable implications as individual assumptions, they are refutable as joint assumptions.
That supermodularity and concavity imply normal demand is shown in ; the earlier result of requires additional smoothness assumptions on utility. Quah's result does not apply to functions that are supermodular on a finite domain. We present a very simple adaptation of Quah's argument in Example 3.
Example 3: Consider the data (x k , p k ) 2 k=1 , where p 1 = (2, 1.1), x 1 = (1, 2), p 2 = (2.1, 1), and x 2 = (2, 1). This collection of data is rationalizable (as it satisfies Afriat's condition) and thus has both a concave and a supermodular rationalization. We show that it has no concave and supermodular rationalization.
Let C ⊆ R 2 be convex and X ⊆ C be a sublattice such that {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3/2, 1), (3/2, 2), (2, 2)} ⊆ X.
Suppose that u : C → R is concave and that u| X is supermodular. We shall prove that u cannot rationalize the data. We first note that p 1 · (3/2, 1) < p 1 · (1, 2) so that we need u(3/2, 1) < u(1, 2) for u to rationalize the data. We then prove that u(2, 1) < u(3/2, 2), which is inconsistent with u rationalizing the data, as p 2 · (3/2, 2) < p 2 · (2, 1). Start from u(3/2, 2) − u(2, 1) = u(3/2, 2) − u(2, 2) + u(2, 2) − u(2, 1). Then, u(3/2, 2) − u(2, 2) = u ((2, 2) − (1/2)(1, 0)) − u(2, 2) ≥ u ((2, 2) − (1/2)(1, 0) − (1/2)(1, 0)) −u ((2, 2) − (1/2)(1, 0)) = u(1, 2) − u(3/2, 2); the inequality above follows from concavity . Supermodularity on X implies that u(2, 2) − u(2, 1) ≥ u(3/2, 2) − u(3/2, 1). Hence, u(3/2, 2) − u(2, 1) ≥ u(1, 2) − u(3/2, 2) + u(3/2, 2) − u(3/2, 1) = u(1, 2) − u(3/2, 1).
This implies that u cannot rationalize the data because u(3/2, 1) < u(1, 2) implies u(2, 1) < u(3/2, 2). Quah's result on normal demand is not directly applicable because the domain on which u is supermodular is finite, and because prices and expenditure both change between observations k = 1 and k = 2. However, a straightforward modification of Quah's arguments gives the result.
